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Book Reviews
PUBLIC PLANNING AND CONTROL OF URBAN AND LAND
DEVELOPMENT. CASES AND MATERIALS.

By Donald G.

Hagman.t St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1973. Pp.
1208. $18.50.
Planning law teachers and planning law students undoubtedly
differ as to the proper criteria for assessing the worth of a casebook
to be used as a teaching tool. Teachers will find Professor Hagman's
casebook satisfying because of its comprehensiveness. The scope of
the materials, more fully outlined below, is broad enough to provide
coverage of every comer of the planning law field as presently conceived-so much so that, in any ordinary planning law course, exclusion of some of the material from specific student assignment will
be necessary.
The student assessment of the book, provided that enough of its
material is deleted from assignments to make the quantity manageable, is likely to be favorable because the content is both interesting
and relevant. Moreover, experience indicates that this casebook can
be useful on the shelves of the practitioner, affording a ready reference to some of the classic cases and principles in planning law
which the practitioner must sometimes assemble for the orientation
of judges and other officials unfamiliar with planning law concepts.
In his introductory chapter, Professor Hagman reiterates his conviction that "legal education is a graduate curriculum as well as a
professional curriculum."' That view explains the interdisciplinary
scope of the work. He has clearly sought to duplicate the broad
range of reading exposure usually achieved by the assignment of a
variegated reading list to graduate students. It is hard to disagree
with the author's approach of editing the collected materials stringently and compiling them in a casebook to permit the law student's
time to be utilized in the most efficient manner. Teachers, when
unable to find a suitable single source of course materials, will assign a long-reading list and then feel pangs of guilt from the realizat
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tion that students are thus forced to spend unproductive time poking around libraries.
Although the Hagman casebook is related to his hornbook, Urban
Planningand Land Development Control Law,' use of the companion hornbook with the casebook is not required.
The casebook's content is responsive to those who are convinced
that public planning and public law are, and should be, interwoven,
particularly in the teaching process. The first six chapters after the
introduction deal with issues generally pigeonholed as "planning"
rather than as "law": plans and planners; national planning; interstate, state and regional planning; local planning; citizen participation; and local government and metropolitan reform. The author's
introduction seems to be faintly apologetic about tendering such
materials for law school use. If he has any reticence on that score,
it is unneeded. Law students can usefully benefit from some exposure to plans and planners so that they may avoid the impression
that the center of things in planning is occupied by judges rather
than by people and politicians.
One might also dispute Professor Hagman's suggestion that the
first six chapters may be omitted when the book is used in a planning school. Those matters may or may not be fully explored elsewhere in the planning curriculum. In teaching planning law to planning students, the teacher and students often find themselves reexamining planning processes, because such reexploration is warranted when the student planners first confront legal constraints.
The book frankly recognizes planning and law as separately identified disciplines. In the chapters which deal with the relationship
between planners and lawyers, it seeks to establish bridges between
them, while recognizing that conflicts do arise-sometimes resulting
in litigation-as to the drafting of ordinances and advocacy in public tribunals, two activities which the organized bar tends to regard
as its exclusive domain. Awareness of the areas of potential conflict
by young municipal lawyers and young planning consultants can be
useful in helping to avoid the pitfalls which could injure their work
products and their clients.
Thereafter, the casebook chapters cover the recognized components of planning law, embracing most of the traditional ones, with
some less traditional inclusions such as taxation and controls relat2.
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ing to unstable land. Three chapters deal with the zoning basics.
One of them is entitled, "The Zoning Classics" because it sets forth
the leading cases which every good planner and planning lawyer
should know: Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Wayne Township;' Golden v.
Planning Board of the Town of Rampo;4 Vickers v. Township
Commission;5 People v. Stover;6 Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of
Dumont;7 Appeal of Girsh;8 Cheney v. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc. ;9
Nectow v. City of Cambridge;'"and, of course, Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co."
It is more than a superficial truth that capacity to function in a
field may depend partly upon an ability to speak the language, to
know the jargon, the passwords. Among tax experts, effective communication requires fluent reference to Internal Revenue Code sections; a few years ago, the ability to identify National Housing Act
sections by number, such as 213, 221 (d) and 235, was essential in
order to get along with the public subsidizers of housing. Classiccase jargon is also a useful shorthand. For example, Rampo is a
handy way to refer to concepts of development timing controls, and
Girsh, to the cognoscenti, conjurs up a whole series of issues involved in judicial prohibitions of exclusion. It is interesting to note
that Professor Hagman surveyed his fellow planning law casebook
and treatise authors to identify the classic cases. The selection thus
has some collective support, ranging from 7 votes out of 10 for
Euclid, to 2 votes for Girsh, Village 2 at New Hope, and Nectow.
In earlier planning law casebooks, it was possible to get the impression that their authors avoided inclusion of all of the classics
because they thought they might be considered tradition-bound or
even lazy for doing so. Those compunctions merely meant that their
planning law teacher-customers had to fill in the classic-case gaps
with handouts or by again subjecting the students to that laborious
reading list.
The other two zoning chapters deal with the zoning "forms of
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952).
30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972).
37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962).
12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 934 (1963).
15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954).
437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970) (listed but not reprinted).
429 Pa. 626, 241 A.2d 81 (1968).
277 U.S. 183 (1928).
272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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action"-such as variances, special uses and amendments-and
additional zoning flexibility devices. The latter chapter is a useful
look at interim zoning, contract zoning, conditional zoning, the
floating zone, planned unit development, density transfer and the
like.
The cases relating to police power and aesthetics are, as might be
expected, not confined to zoning devices, but include architectural
controls and a look at various kinds of billboard battles.
In dealing with subdivision control, the realistic and pragmatic
aspect of the work comes through the attention devoted to those
exactions which are extracted from developers as conditions of subdivision approval. Both the product and the process of subdivision
exactions can provide the student with a look at constitutional issues in the real world. The product of the exactions-requiring a
developer to contribute community facilities without compensation-relates to substantive due process because a balancing analysis of reasonableness is involved. The process of the exactions provides a look into equal protection because that process is often little
more than naked negotiation with developers, who, in view of the
time constraints they face, are usually unwilling to insist on establishment of uniform standards to ensure equal treatment.
In addition to building and housing codes, the casebook also considers other public tools which correctly, although not traditionally,
are regarded as. controlling development. The relationship of eminent domain to development (and redevelopment) is obvious and
accepted. The importance of taxation as a land-use control may
surprise some students before they study the chapter on that matter. In addition to the general effect of property taxes, there are the
taxing policies related to open space and, as in the case of the single
tax, to the stimulation of development.
Professor Hagman does not provide a chapter on urban redevelopment as such, which is probably just as well, since redevelopment
might be more properly classed as a program, using a combination
of many tools, rather than a fundamental tool of development control itself. Thus avoiding an unnecessary look backward, the Hagman casebook takes substantial looks at the present and future,
with chapters on the relationship of land-use controls to race and
poverty, as well as a chapter on unstable land. The race and poverty
portion examines the exclusionary cases and the inclusionary programs, but the examination is not likely to become quickly dated
because it goes to the fundamentals of the problems rather than the
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details of the programs. The consideration of unstable land is also
problem-related, with consideration of local and federal taxation
and the role of insurance, as exemplified in the National Flood
Insurance Program.
The author, having bet correctly on the disappearance of traditional federal redevelopment subsidy, is also betting that the National Environmental Policy Act of 196912 will be with us for some
time. The logical relationship of the work of the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to planning may be apparent, but what
is not apparent is the likelihood that EPA, combining financial aid
with regulatory policies, can become significantly involved in local
and state land-use decision-making.
Another chapter likely to remain relevant for some time is the one
on new towns, which includes brief consideration of new town government. That kind of material can be a rich source of research
areas for graduate students. For example, a study of the way in
which Columbia, Maryland, has been governed would be an interesting thesis subject, indeed. Columbia, having its municipal and
school functions provided at the level of Howard County, provides
a good example of why, in some situations, separate municipal incorporation of the new town should not be attempted. In developing
Columbia, the Rouse interests stayed away from separate incorporation, initially, because they did not want to break with the wholesome Maryland tradition of keeping local government at the county
level. But such respect for Maryland tradition was unexpectedly
rewarding at a later stage. After two of Columbia's villages had been
developed, the new residents of Columbia, oversupplied with Washington and Baltimore lawyers, initiated litigation to reduce and
eliminate some of the further development which had been planned.
Those new-resident objectors, mostly unsuccessful in the courts,
might have been very successful politically in preventing the completion of Columbia if a new town had been incorporated; if Columbia had been incorporated as a city the new residents could well
have taken control of its government and the public development
controls. Instead, the new-resident objectors remained a small mi12.

42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-35, 4341-47 (1970).
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nority in the total population of Howard County, and hence, as yet,
have not taken over the county's political processes.
That kind of window into explorable areas constitutes a useful
aspect of a study volume. Another such window is the international
comparative look provided by the last chapter, which spends nearly
70 pages on the English system of planning and land use control.
Thus, although most of the other chapters are admittedly confined
to the American context, a comparative approach is made optionally available by the English system chapter. A familiarity with
what happens in England is, like ability to use the classic-case
jargon, a fashionable attribute for a planning lawyer and planner.
As Hagman notes, 4 out of 5 of the current casebooks on American
planning law have been authored by teachers who made a pilgrimage to study how "the English do it."
It is clear that the English experience in planning, as in other
social machinery, may serve to presage, in a general way, what will
happen in United States in the future. As the author points out, we
are now following the English trend of being more willing to trade
away growth for amenity, in centralizing governmental power over
development, and in making planning decisions on an ad hoc basis
rather than by adherence to express rules guaranteeing predictability.
Physical development control, which moved away from center
stage in the United States in the 1960's, is now returning to constitute one of the half-dozen salient areas of attention in our nation.
Heightened student interest in planning law, as evidenced by the
increase of such courses in many law schools and the larger student
populations taking them, is somewhat explained by the dynamic
nature of the wide-ranging subject matter included in the Hagman
casebook.
David W Craig*
*

Member, Pennsylvania Bar; Adjunct Professor of Administration, Carnegie-Mellon

School of Urban and Public Affairs; formerly, Visiting Lecturer Yale University, Planning
Department, and Adjunct Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh, Graduate School of
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By Dr.
Emerson P. Schmidt.t Los Angeles: Nash Publishing, 1973. Pp. 204. $10.00.
UNION POWER

AND THE PUBLIC

INTEREST.

Before commencing any review, the critic must determine for
what purpose a work is undertaken and to what audience it is addressed since one would not apply the same standards to a lyric
poem as one would to an epic. Most books are written for one of two
audiences: for the educated general public which has no particular
background in the area in question or for scholars who have a specialized background. When addressed to the first audience, books
are normally designed to inform the audience of certain generally
accepted "fundamentals" and sometimes through such information
to affect the political actions and decisions of the audience. When
addressed to the second audience, books are designed to report new
discoveries and to provide new theories which will take the place of
old shibboleths. Occasionally, one comes across a work which is
addressed to both audiences and is well enough written to entertain
as well as elucidate. However, books such as Mattingly's The
Armada' are members of a rare species in which Emerson P.
Schmidt's Union Power and the Public Interest does not fall.
Indeed, Dr. Schmidt would make no pretense that Union Power
and the Public Interest is a work of scholarship as well as a tool of
education. Rather, the whole purpose of the book is to set before the
public the author's conservative views regarding the impact of legal
protections afforded labor unions by state and federal governments
and thus hopefully persuade the public to support labor law reform.
It would be less than realistic to recognize that the views expressed
by the author are minority views, at least within the intelligentsia
whose liberal imagination throughout the century has been preoccupied with the sufferings of those for whose plight the liberals have
felt themselves responsible.' Unfortunately, the picture of the oppressed industrial workers which so dominated the liberal mind
bears little relationship to reality.' To confront this liberal imagina1. G. MArINGLY,
2.

V.

THE ARMADA (1959).
BROMBERT, THE INTELLECTUAL HERO: STUDIES IN THE FRENCH NOVEL, 1880-1955, at

140-49 (1961).
3. American Iron & Steel Institute, News Release, Oct. 16, 1974. The average employee
in the steel industry earns $9.32 an hour in wages and fringe benefits.
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tion with brute facts, as Dr. Schmidt does with some degree of
clarity and vigor, is a commendable activity. However, it is probably not possible for this reviewer to fully appreciate such an effort
because one defect of his education is an excessive devotion to style
which makes him uneasy over Dr. Schmidt's combination of quotations (Adam Smith, Professor Simons and George Meany) with
summations of scholarly research. Additionally, his professional
soul winces at the author's lay analysis of legal principles and judicial decisions.
Certainly, the author performs a useful public service in emphasizing what politicians, newspapermen, college professors and union
officials would have us all forget-the fact that one of the
cornerstones, if not the foundation, of union power is the omnipresent threat of violence. Indeed, David McDonald, former president
of the United Steelworkers of America, graphically explained the
origins of dues check-off in the steel industry as follows: After recognition of the USW by one of the major steel companies, the USW
began to collect dues from the company's employees as they left the
plant on pay day. The reluctance of these loyal unionists to pay dues
led to the formation of collection squads whose battles with their
fellow employees developed into mass riots which prevented the
oncoming shift from entering the plant. Faced with this disruption
of production, the company's management readily agreed to the
union's requests for dues check-off.'
The picket line, the symbol of unionism, epitomizes violence-present or threatened-as the keystone of union power. The
purpose of the picket line is not to persuade or to request sympathy,
a single picket could do that; the real purpose is to coerce-to prevent others from crossing the line.5 Although most pickets would
prefer to deter individuals from crossing a picket line by peaceful
though illegal actions such as blocking public highways, trespassing
on private property and interfering with contractual relations, many
are quick to resort to more violent tactics if necessary. Indeed, any
attempt to operate by a struck company is inevitably met with a
concerted campaign of sabotage and terrorism, including violence
directed at those individuals crossing the picket line.
4. D. McDONALD, UNION MAN 120-25 (1969).
5. "'[Peaceful picketing' is a self-contradiction and aptly describes nothing that is
known to man." Cooper Co. v. Los Angeles Bldg. Unit, 3 CCH LAB. CAS. 60,728, 60,731 (Cal.
Super. Ct., County of Los Angeles 1941).
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Lawlessness on the picket line is winked at by police officials who
will normally refuse to intervene or will delay intervention as long
as possible, fearing that such intervention-known as law enforcement when the illegal activities are conducted by ordinary citizens
or college students-will bring unpopularity. The unwillingness of
guardians of law and order to enforce the law in the context of a
labor dispute is seen by many union members as a tacit recognition
of their right to engage in illegal conduct in the course of a strike,
and thus encourages further violence and illegal activity. Moreover,
the laissez-faire attitude of public officials creates a situation where
a small minority of workers can coerce not only the employer but
also the great majority of their fellow workers. Wildcat strikes are
epidemic in the coal industry not because the vast majority of the
miners are adverse to or do not need to work, but because they are
consistently terrorized by a small group of malcontents who, exempt
from interference by the law, punish by all manner of violence any
who fail to respect their picket line, regardless of the reason for its
existence.
If violence is the keystone of union power, surely monopoly, as Dr.
Schmidt indicates, constitutes one of the pillars. Certainly, nothing
in the law seems more absurd than the union's exemption from the
anti-trust laws.7 The purpose of the anti-trust laws is to preclude the
elimination of price competition; the purpose of labor unions is to
eliminate wages as a factor in price competition. Since labor costs
constitute a major component of the price of any product, the labor
anti-trust exemption necessitates the lessening of price competition.
Perhaps even more absurd is the present proposal of Senator Philip
Hart (Democrat, Michigan) to require the breakup of companies
which have dominant positions in certain industries, but to leave
untouched the position of unions which dominate several different
industries.8 It is difficult to see how the country is threatened by the
existence of General Motors, which is but the largest of four domestic auto makers, but not by the existence of the UAW, which repre6. Representative of the general feeling that labor is above the law is the recent statement
by Arnold Miller, President of the UMW, that the UMW would not comply with any injunction issued under the Taft-Hartley Act, § 29 U.S.C. § 178 (1970), prohibiting the UMW from
conducting a nationwide coal strike. BNA DAmY LAB. REP., Oct. 10, 1974, at 198.
7. Clayton Act § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 6 (1970).
8. The Industrial Reorganization Act, S. 1167, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). See generally
"Statement of the United States Steel Corporation before the Senate Subcommittee on AntiTrust and Monopoly regarding The Industrial Reorganization Act."
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sents not only the employees of all four domestic automobile producers but also has a dominant position in the aerospace and agriculture equipment manufacturing industries. Possibly, Senator Hart's
anti-trust perspective is influenced by the fact that he owes his
Senate seat to UAW money and UAW votes.
It is one thing to enumerate the sources of union power, to illuminate the detrimental effect of such power on the public interest and
to suggest directions for federal remedial legislation, but quite another to examine the feasibility of such legislation from a political
standpoint. And yet, this latter point, which Dr. Schmidt does not
consider, is perhaps the most significant problem connected with
labor law reform. Little is clearer to this reviewer than the fact the
Congress, as it is presently constituted, is incapable of enacting
legislation which is opposed by the unions. Although the AFL-CIO
may not yet have a veto-proof Congress, it does have one which is
responsive to its desires because of the extent to which Congressmen
have become dependent on AFL-CIO campaign contributions
It is obvious, then, that legislation which benefits the public at
the expense of organized labor stands little chance of passage until
such time as the present electoral system is reformed and the power
of money removed from politics. The growth of the country and the
importance of national media exposure have created a situation,
unforeseen by the constitutional framers, in which a successful candidacy for public office is dependent upon an enormous campaign
chest. The only dependable source of campaign funds for candidates
who are not independently wealthy are those individuals or organizations with financial interests dependent upon government favor.
For such persons, campaign contributions constitute a necessary
business expense. In return, these contributors expect and receive
value for their contributions. Where public officials are dependent
upon the favors of special interest groups for their election, the
interests of such groups are necessarily favored at the expense of the
public. Only a small majority of elected officials can successfully
avoid the pressures of those upon whom they are dependent for
support. Accordingly, restrictions upon union power, the elimination of farm subsidies and the reform of the transportation system
are all matters which will not be accomplished until a system of
public campaign financing is created."0
9. D. CADDY, THE HUNDRED MILLION DoLLAR PAYOFF (1974).
10. The enactment of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendment of 1974, Pub. L.
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However, it should be recognized that the removal of the power
of the purse from political campaigns will not automatically lead to
the creation of a political situation in which the public interest will
be protected at the expense of labor, for the political strength of
labor comes not just from its purse but also from its organization.
Indeed, the decline of the big city political machines has left the
labor unions as the only organized force in American politics today.
The great contribution that labor made to the Humphrey campaign
in 1968 was not money but men-it was labor's manpower and
organization which made possible that last desperate drive in October, 1968, which nearly overcame the impact of far left-wing
intransigence and almost avoided the Nixon presidency." Accordingly, it is clear that a new election reform law which simply limited
cash contributions but did not regulate contributions in kind would
increase, rather than diminish, the power of the labor barons whose
organizational resources cannot be matched by the business community.'2 It is impossible to conceive of General Motors ceasing the
major part of its business activities for a two-week period before the
election to devote its energies to the election of conservative candidates; for the United Auto Workers of America not to devote its
energies in the last two weeks before an election to the campaigns
of pro-labor candidates is equally impossible to conceive of. Accordingly, any real campaign reform measure must carefully regulate
both contributions in cash and contributions in kind if it is to diminish rather than enhance the power of organized labor.
Even assuming, however, that real election reform is enacted, one
must anticipate that the Congress would be little more inclined to
enact measures desired by the majority of the public if such measures are opposed by union leaders. The real danger of a democracy
is not, as De Tocqueville 3 thought, the tyranny of a majority, but
rather the tyranny of a minority which is able, by a concentration
of force, to achieve its ends even in the face of some opposition from
the majority.'4 The power of organized labor in the United States
No. 93-443 (Oct. 15, 1974), U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4618 (Nov. 15, 1974), will increase
rather than decrease the power of the purse in politics because public financing of presidential
but not congressional campaigns will permit the special interests groups to concentrate all
their resources in the congressional elections.
11. T. WroTE, THE MAKING OF A PRESmENT-1968, at 364-66 (1969).
12. This fact probably accounts for the AFL-CIO endorsement of public campaign financing. BNA DAILY LAB. REP., April 2, 1974, at 64.
13. 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMEmCA 271-89 (1835).
14. R. DAL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 134-35 (1956).
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will ordinarily be great enough to preclude legislation inimical to its
interests even though the majority of the people may favor such
legislation. However, if the majority becomes actively aroused, if
the people seek to exert their will, then, as in 194715 and in 1959,11
the Congress may be forced to further limit union power.
Events of recent years, however, have demonstrated that the mere
passage of legislation designed to correct abuses does not automatically result in their elimination, even if accompanied by purposeful
administration. In a democracy, governmental action is dependent
upon the good will of the minority to an extent not generally recognized. Indeed, determined opposition on the part of a minority is
fatal to a democratic society. A policy vehemently opposed by a
minority must be dropped or the vehemence met by force. In all
likelihood, this will lead to further violence and initiation of a vicious cycle of disintegration from which the society may never recover.
The conflict between the majority and the minority following the
passage of legislation may follow two courses. First, if a small fringe
element of the minority is completely deteined to realize its ends,
it may initiate terrorist or guerilla activity to protest the restrictive
legislation. If this element of the minority is small and lacks support
fronf others, then the majority may be able to suppress terroristic
actions with little damage to the framework of the society. Indeed,
it is because the leftist terrorist fringe in the United States is so
small and receives, relatively speaking, little support from the other
leftist elements that the establishment has been able to hold it in
check with little damage to democratic institutions. While the experience of Ulster shows the impossibility of controlling terrorism in a
democratic society when the terrorist group is large and receives
widespread sympathy and support from other elements of the minority, it is unlikely that legislative action which would interfere
with the exercise of monopoly power by labor unions would provoke
this sort of terrorism. Legislation which affects only the economic
interests of individuals does not normally produce a terroristic reaction of this nature because terrorism is, from an economic standpoint, self-defeating. Terrorism is adopted by those whose emotional states are such that they not only believe that the end justifies
15. Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1970).
16. Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure Act of 1959, Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub.
L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
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the means, but also secretly enjoy the means which they are
"forced" to adopt. Unfortunately, extremism and sadism have their
adherents in all parties and institutions: left, right, academic, business and, certainly, labor.
The second course that post-legislative conflict between majority
and minority may take involves universal but generally pacific resistance to the legislation among all the elements which compose
the minority. The prime example of this kind of conflict is in Great
Britain today. Upon taking office, the government of Prime Minister Heath resolved to enact labor legislation (closely patterned, interestingly enough, on the Labor-Management Relations Act) which
would bring some order to the chaos which has characterized British
labor-management relations in this century and which has been a
prime factor in the decline of Britain. 7 Accordingly, Parliament
duly enacted an Industrial Relations Act 18 in face of the declared
opposition of the trade unions. The efforts of the trade unions did
not stop the passage of the bill and progressed from political opposition to civil disobedience. Indeed, massive strikes were launched to
protest the passage of the law, while union officials openly encouraged resistance. Following the defeat of the Conservative government in a strike forced by the National Miners Union, the new
Labor government of Prime Minister Wilson repealed the law and
embarked on a doomed attempt to enter into a "social contract"
with the labor barons pursuant to which the government would
further "soak the rich" while the unions would moderate their wage
demands and thus decrease the inflation rate. 9 In so doing, however, Wilson has merely spotlighted the crucial issue which faces
Britain today, and perhaps most other Western countries
tomorrow-Who rules, the people or the unions? Once that question
comes to the fore, democracy itself will be in grave danger if unions
continue to frustrate a democratic answer through their ability to
enforce their views by means of economic chaos.
From this perspective, then, the most important problem posed
by union power is not how that power is misused or what legislation
must be enacted to correct it, but rather how, under our present
political structure, needed legislation can be enacted and how, if
enactment is met with determined opposition from union leaders
17. P. EINZIG, DECLINE
18.
19.

AND FALL? BRITAIN'S CRISIS INTHE

Industrial Relations Act 1971, c. 72.
Trade Union and Labor Relations Act 1974, c. 52.

'60's (1969).
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and union members alike, the legislation can be enforced. To these
questions there are no easy answers. In the past, certainly, the
American political structure has proved durable enough to enact
legislation restraining union power. Union leaders and union members have been loyalenough to the system to accept, without extralegal opposition, legislation which they have bitterly opposed. However, there are no guarantees that the future will follow the past in
this regard and there now exist some ominous signs that it will not.
If there is any fundamental weakness to Dr. Schmidt's useful work,
it is in its failure to recognize at least the implications of this larger
problem.
James T. Carney*

THE BENCHWARMERS: THE PRIVATE WORLD OF THE
POWERFUL FEDERAL JUDGES. By Joseph C. Goulden.t

New York: Weybright and Talley, 1974. Pp. 375.
$12.50.
Joseph C. Goulden is the author of The Superlaywers and, having
found a good thing, has fixed his reportorial eye on the "private
world of the powerful federal judges." Watergate alone cannot explain the recent surge of interest not just in things legal (and illegal), but also in the dramatispersonae acting on the legal stage: the
lawyers and the judges. It may not be long before the secret and
powerful world of the clerks of court is laid bare.
Goulden's approach is descriptive: how federal judges get to the
bench; how the good and the bad ones conduct themselves once
there; how the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
operates; and, finally, how the judges attempt to regulate themselves. It is a hair-raising journey, made more so by the knowledge
t Freelance Writer, contributing editor of The Washingtonian.
1. J. GouLDFN, THE SuPEaLAwymas (1972).
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that a look at the judicial system of any of our states would probably
make The Benchwarmers pretty tame reading.
It is probably fair to say that most lawyers generally regard federal judges as being more competent and judicious as a whole than
their state court brethren. The reason for this may lie in the fact
that federal judges have a much greater degree of "independence"
than state court judges. Goulden points out that the drafters of the
Articles of Confederation were anxious to avoid the situation that
existed before the Revolution when colonial judges served at the
pleasure of the Crown. Instead, an independent judiciary was established and judges continued to serve during their good behavior. The
Constitution, of course, adopted this same approach: "The Judges,
both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices
during good Behaviour ...
."
Although the Constitution assures the federal judiciary of independence from the executive and legislative powers, it is surprisingly silent on how the appointment of a federal judge is to be made
and what the qualifications should be. For example, nothing in the
Constitution requires a federal judge or a Supreme Court Justice to
be a lawyer. Goulden says that the only reason that federal judges
are appointed by the President is that presidents have simply been
following the example set by George Washington. One wonders (although Goulden does not explore) whether the Supreme Court has
the constitutional power to appoint federal judges. Not until 1948
was it explicitly provided that federal judges had to be appointed
with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Despite the independence assured to the federal judiciary by the
Constitution, it would be naive to assume that "politics" is not
involved in the selection of federal judges. The senators from the
state where the vacancy exists generally have to give their blessings
to the applicant; the Justice Department has to approve; and, depending on the particular administration's willingness to cooperate,
the American Bar Association's Committee on the Federal Judiciary
also gets into the act. Goulden makes much of the ABA Committee's role: its secrecy, its hidden biases, its membership's not being
representative of the bar as a whole, and its orientation towards the
2.
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status quo. Some of these criticisms may be well taken, but what is
disturbing is Goulden's unwillingness to probe the implications of
his criticisms. There is a suggestion that the whole process would
produce better results if it were more open and representative.
These are sacred words today, and it is easy to sympathize with
someone wanting to let the sun shine in on the federal judiciary. It
is troublesome, though, to think in terms of representativeness when
dealing with the selection of judges. The inference always seems to
be that the selecting body should be representative of particular
interests, so that the judges selected are representative of those
interests. Somehow the concept of interest groups picking judges to
reflect their interests makes the idea of electing judges seem more
attractive; despite its many vices, the selection of judges by the
ballot has at least the virtue of diminishing (not eliminating) the
selection of judges by groups expecting to have their views represented on the bench by their candidate. Whether judges should be
representative of interests is a concept that bears considerable inquiry, but unfortunately The Benchwarmers does not contain such
an inquiry.
Goulden's best chapters deal with the judicial system working (in
New York City) and failing (in Chicago). Judge David N. Edelstein,
then chief judge of the Southern District of New York, is seen wrestling with the case of United States v. IBM, Inc., 3 described by
Business Week (before the AT&T antitrust suit) as "the largest and
most complex antitrust battle ever waged."I There is an interesting
vignette about Edelstein's confrontation with IBM's lawyers and
the resulting finding of contempt of court against IBM for its refusal
to turn over certain documents. The sanction imposed by Edelstein
on IBM was a fine of $150,000 a day, presumably (although Goulden
does not tell us) ensuring the delivery of the documents. The tone
of the chapter on Chicago is set with a description of a hearing where
the judge irrelevantly runs on about the railroad industry for a halfhour, leaving the assembled lawyers with one thought: he "had
presided over court while stone-eyed drunk." 5 If Goulden's descriptions of the federal judicial system in Chicago are accurate, one
wonders how anyone can practice law in that city amongst the apparent pervasive atmosphere of fraud and corruption.
3.
4.
5.
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It is hard to write anything new on Watergate, so satiated are we
with it, and the chapter on Judge Sirica is, consequently, not very
informative. In addition, one wonders whether the chapter really
lives up to its title, "When the System Works." Without attempting
to diminish in any manner Judge Sirica's role, Watergate probably
stands more for the proposition that the political system works than
that the federal judicial system works.
The chapter on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
reveals the best and the worst of The Benchwarmers. It describes
in engaging detail the personalities and backgrounds of the judges
on that circuit. The reader learns of the deep policy and personality
split between the pro- and anti-Bazelon judges. David L. Bazelon
is the widely known author of the now discarded Durham' rule,
which overturned the criminal insanity test of knowledge of right
from wrong set forth in M'Naghten's Case.7 Bazelon's knowledge of
and interest in psychiatry have produced results in criminal cases
that have been strongly opposed by other members of the D.C.
Circuit and district courts. Although the split is deep and bitter
because of its personality tones, it seems a healthy division; the
issues deeply split society, and it would probably be more upsetting
if the federal judiciary simply overlooked them. What makes this
chapter troublesome is that the author refuses to be drawn into
these issues; he prefers to discuss the personalities and failures of
the judges without dealing with the issues that divide them. It
makes for interesting reading, but one wonders whether anything of
substance has been said.
Perhaps the book's main contribution is to catalogue the weaknesses of the present incumbents of the federal district courts. To
be sure, the future will produce different incumbents, but one suspects that the weaknesses will not have changed very much. Given
this almost inescapable fact, one wonders why Goulden did not feel
compelled to suggest alternatives for improving the federal bench.
A harder task, to be sure, but certainly a more valuable one than
that performed by the author.
John M. Duff, Jr.*
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